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Law enforcement and wrongful arrests with
endogenously (in)competent o¢ cers 
Ajit Mishra, University of Bath & Andrew Samuel, Loyola University
Abstract
Economic intuition suggests that enforcement errors incentivize crimes, therefore
o¢ cers must be penalized for committing such errors. Legal scholars argue that if
penalties for errors are severe, o¢ cers may become timid while policing (thereby en-
couraging crime). We evaluate these arguments in a model where o¢ cers invest in
competence. Competence increases the o¢ cers ability to identify criminals. Low
sanctions for errors encourages bold policing by o¢ cers but may still raise the equilib-
rium level of crime because it also discourages investments in competence. Granting
immunity to only competent o¢ cers ("qualied immunity") reduces both errors and
crimes when competence is observable.
Keywords: Mistakes in law enforcement, immunity, detection
1 Introduction
Law enforcement agents are not incapable of making enforcement errors; that is, arresting
or detaining innocent citizens (wrongful arrests"). This issue has gained much attention
recently, especially in light of several high prole cases involving police misconduct. Many
of these cases have occurred in the U.S., but there is ample evidence that wrongful arrests
occur routinely in almost every country. Indeed, a recent news article found that only a
small fraction of arrests lead to actual convictions, while the majority of the cases brought
against those arrested were dropped.1
The authors would like to thank Philip Curry, John Dillbary, Murat Mungan, three anonymous refer-
ees, and seminar participants at the Southern Economic Association Meetings (2016), Villanova University,
Canadian Law and Economics Meetings (2016), and IIM Udaipur (2017). All remaining errors are ours.
1By some measures, around 47% of those arrested were never convicted (As Arrest Records Rise, Amer-
icans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2014). Another measure of
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The economic literature on wrongful arrests, or enforcement errors more broadly, has
shown that mistakes weaken the deterrent e¤ect of criminal sanctions because they lower
the opportunity cost of committing a crime (Png 1986, Posner 1999). Thus, a regulator will
want to discourage these errors by penalizing o¢ cers for such errors. While such disincentives
for errors appear reasonable, it has also been argued that these penalties may themselves
weaken enforcement because it could make o¢ cers overly cautious in encounters with criminal
suspects (for fear of being punished if the individual turns out to be innocent).2 For example,
a police spokesman recently stated that if sanctions are large, then o¢ cers may drive
around and put blinders on and not investigate suspicious circumstances."3 Importantly,
this argument is also acknowledged in judicial opinions concerning cases of policing errors.
In Wyatt v. Cole (504 U.S. 158 [1992]) the U.S. Supreme Court stated that some form of
immunity was necessary in order to prevent public servants from being unduly timid in the
performance of their duties." Thus, these arguments suggest that regulators recognize that
there is a trade-o¤ because, while strict penalties for errors will reduce errors and strengthen
the deterrent e¤ect of criminal sanctions, they could also weaken the intensity of enforcement
e¤orts (or probability of arresting criminals) by making o¢ cers more hesitant or timid in
encounters with criminal suspects.
The primary goal of this paper is to develop a model of enforcement to study this trade-o¤
between disincentivising wrongful arrests and incentivising proactive enforcement e¤orts that
may sometimes lead to honest (enforcement) mistakes." We study the e¤ects of this trade-
o¤ on crime under three penalty regimes: full immunity from penalties, where o¢ cers face
little or no penalty for wrongfully arresting an innocent citizen; no immunity, where o¢ cers
face harsh penalties for wrongful arrests; and third, qualied immunity" where o¢ cers are
penalized for a wrongful arrest only if they acted incompetently. The justication behind
qualied immunity or conditional penalties is based on the legal idea that o¢ cers should
not be penalized for honest mistakes especially since they often have to make split second
decisions" in many situations.4 For example in a case involving a Los Angeles Sherrifs
detective who erred in executing a search warrant without probable cause, the court sided
with the detective stating that the o¢ cers were not so plainly incompetent so as to be
denied qualied immunity" (Messerschmidt v. Millender 565 U.S. 704 [2012]).5 Thus, the
wrongful stops is the hit rate, the rate at which police searches (usually of drivers) have turned up evidence
of crime. Persico and Todd (2006) nd that the hit rate for men is around 22%.
2This is especially true since there is usually no sanction against inaction(see Geest 2012).
3Can mandatory insurance solve the problem of policing errors?, Insurance Business in America Magazine,
June 28, 2016.
4Standton v. Sims: A new standard for qualied immunity?" Jurist, March 2 2014.
5It should be noted that we focus on immunity from penalties imposed on o¢ cers by either an internal
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presumed rationale behind qualied immunity is that if o¢ cials are competent, then they
will be very unlikely to apprehend innocent individuals. Hence, by only granting immunity
to o¢ cers who act competently, fewer innocent victims will be harassed by wrongful arrests
and the perverse e¤ects of wrongful arrests can be minimized, while also allowing for the
possibility of honest mistakes. We use our model to examine the validity of these legal
arguments, and whether qualied immunity mitigates some of the problems that arise from
granting o¢ cers full immunity.
To study these issues we develop a model in which o¢ cers choose to become competent
or remain incompetent. Becoming competent is a form of human capital acquisition which
entails investing in policing skills.6 Competent o¢ cers are, therefore, able to distinguish be-
tween innocent individuals and criminals with a higher probability than incompetent o¢ cers.
Since a competent o¢ cer can more frequently distinguish between criminals and innocents,
such o¢ cers are unlikely to arrest innocents.7 Incompetent o¢ cers, however, cannot distin-
guish between these two types, and therefore, may frequently arrest innocent individuals.8
Innocents who are arrested are, at some cost to themselves, eventually acquitted by the
judicial system but criminals are punished. Further, o¢ cers who charge or arrest innocent
individuals also incur some costs (to their reputation and liability) which depends on the
liability regime: no immunity, qualied immunity, or full immunity. Whereas, o¢ cers who
correctly arrest a criminal obtain a reward.9
Within this framework we nd that there is indeed a trade-o¤between pro-active policing
and mistakes because there are two opposing e¤ects on o¢ cersbehavior. The mechanism
of the rst e¤ect, which we term the timidity e¤ect is as follows. If o¢ cers do not enjoy
disciplinary board or a supervisor. However, these sanctions could also be interpreted as the damages paid
within the tort" system - which are often viewed as a form of privatized sanctions.
6We use the term e¤ort here very broadly to include investments by the o¢ cer in learning, human capital,
or skill acquisition relevant to the case or generally. David Simon (former crime reporter for the Baltimore
Sun and writer of the TV crime drama The Wire" notes that:  There is a real skill set to good police work,"
(Simon 2015) but notes that it requires hard work by police o¢ cers to obtain these skills, and DeAngelo and
Owens (2015) also make a similar claim.
7Although, we use the term arrest, the actions of the police in our model could be also dened as
investigatory detention" (Dix 1985; Dery and Meehan 2015). At least within the U.S., the distinctions
between arrests, detention, and apprehension are increasingly di¢ cult to distinguish. Since apprehension is
a relatively broad term, for the purposes of this paper we consider an arrest or apprehension as someone
being questioned without a warrant, or investigated without being charged. In section 4 we consider an
extension that incorporates such Fourth Amendment" issues.
8Dharmapala and Miceli (2012) consider false arrests as situations where o¢ cers plant evidenceduring
search and seizures. To avoid confusion we use the term wrongful arrests" instead.
9It is worth noting that the idea that up-front investment in skills that make future decisions more accurate
also appears in else where in the literature. Arlen and MacLeod (2005) study a model where doctors invest in
skills that make them better at determining the right treatment later. Similarly, in Sandford (2010) experts
invest in skills that help them identify what the client needs.
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immunity and the penalty for wrongful arrests is su¢ ciently large, then neither competent
nor incompetent o¢ cers will choose to make arrests when they are uncertain about whether
a citizen is a criminal or innocent (i.e. they will be too timid"). Since incompetent o¢ cers
are always uncertain about the citizens identity (innocent or criminal), they never make
arrests, while competent o¢ cers make arrests only when they are certain. If the equilibrium
fraction of incompetent o¢ cers is su¢ ciently large many criminals will escape detection,
because o¢ cers are too timid" to take action under uncertainty, and this inaction weakens
deterrence. On the other hand, if o¢ cers are fully immune, then they will act boldly" in
the sense that they will make arrests even when they are uncertain about a citizens identity,
which ceteris paribus strengthens deterrence. Thus, in contrast to the canonical Beckerian
model of enforcement and much of the literature on enforcement errors (e.g. Png 1986),
here preventing wrongful arrests (through no immunity) can negatively impact enforcement
because o¢ cers will choose inaction in situations where they are uncertain about the agents
identity.
The positive impact that immunity can have on raising compliance (the timidity e¤ect
identied above) is, however, o¤set by a competence e¤ect. This second e¤ect arises because
the immunity regime also a¤ects the o¢ cers endogenous choice of becoming competent.
When the damages are large and there is no immunity, then although o¢ cers are afraid
to make arrests under uncertainty, it gives them a stronger incentive to become competent
because competence prevents them from making mistaken arrests. Whereas, when penalties
are low (or o¢ cers fully immune), although they are not afraid to make arrests, a large
fraction choose to be incompetent, which in turn weakens enforcement (by inducing more
wrongful arrests and consequently higher opportunity cost of criminality). Thus, although
giving o¢ cers immunity does prevent them from being too timid" when carrying out their
duties (which strengthens enforcement), it could also encourage incompetence (which weak-
ens enforcement). Since these two e¤ects o¤set each other, the e¤ect of enforcement errors
on compliance is ambiguous.
Indeed, we show that under some conditions if the competence e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong,
it discourages o¢ cers from making human capital investments in competent policing, which
reduces deterrence. Thus, rather counter intuitively we nd that although granting law
enforcement broad powers and immunity can make them bold" to take action under uncer-
tainty, it may actually raise rather the level of crime because it also simultaneously incen-
tivizes incompetence and less e¤ective policing.
Our paper also o¤ers insight into validity of legal arguments that claim that o¢ cials with
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more complex discretionary responsibilities must enjoy more leniency for mistakes than those
with less complex responsibilities (Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800 [1982]). Comparative
static results from our model suggest that when there is full immunity, if cases become more
complex o¢ cers will choose to become less competent and crime will rise. Whereas, when
there is no immunity then more complex criminal cases may encourage competence. This
suggests (consistent with the legal opinion) that the immunity regime must be tailored to the
level of complexity of the case that the o¢ cial encounters. However, because (as we show)
the relationship between deterrence, immunity, and case complexity is not straightforward,
incentives must be structured carefully in order to avoid stiing competence and raising
crime. To our knowledge our paper is the rst to formally study this relationship.
The next set of results we derive examine whether qualied immunity improves outcomes
relative to either full or no immunity. Here we nd that whether qualied immunity improves
outcomes depends on whether the disciplinary agency (henceforth, court") can determine
whether the o¢ cer acted competently or not. If the court can observe the o¢ cers choice
of becoming competent (and grant immunity only to competent o¢ cers who made errors),
then qualied immunity does improve outcomes and reduce the arrest of innocent citizens. If
there is judicial uncertainty in the sense that courts cannot observe the o¢ cers choice, then
the impact of qualied immunity is less clear. Specically, if courts base their decision to
grant immunity purely on their belief that the o¢ cer acted competently (conditional on the
charges being dropped against a citizen), then even qualied immunity discourages o¢ cers
from becoming competent, and consequently the level of compliance (and apprehension of
innocent citizens) doesnt improve. The kernel of the reasoning is that under uncertainty
qualied immunity is no longer granted conditional on an individual o¢ cers competence
decision, but is rather conditioned upon the average level of competence. This e¤ectively
creates a lemons problem" that results in all o¢ cers choosing to remain incompetent.10
Our paper contributes to the literature on enforcement errors, and is closely related to
DeAngelo and McCannon (2016). Specically, in their paper o¢ cers can be both skilled and
unskilled, which is similar to our notion of competence. Further, similar to our framework
skilled o¢ cers rarely make enforcement errors. But, because reputation matters to o¢ cers,
when there are a large fraction of criminals, unskilled o¢ cers over-enforce by sanctioning
citizens that they believe to be innocent in order to improve their reputation.11 Thus, in both
10This nding is related to Dharmapala and Miceli (2012) who show that if (some) o¢ cers are bad and
can plant evidence", a tort liability system for o¢ cers need not always be better than other warrant based
regimes. In contrast to their model where bad o¢ cers willfully plant evidence, in our model o¢ cers make
mistakes because they are simply incompetent.
11Their model is one of bureaucratic squawks" (Leaver 2009) in which o¢ cers try to preserve their
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papers unskilled (or incompetent o¢ cers) are the source of most of the enforcement errors.
However, there are several important di¤erences. First, an important di¤erence between
their model and ours is that in their model both the fraction of criminals and the fraction of
skilled o¢ cers are exogenous. Whereas in our model both these fractions are endogenously
determined, and importantly, these fractions are very sensitive to the sanctioning regime.
Thus, in contrast to their paper where errors always lower deterrence, in our paper the level
of crime may rise or fall depending on the relative strength of the competence and timidity
e¤ects. Second, in their model the reputation benet that the o¢ cer receives from being
competent or skilled depends on the posterior beliefs of the court. In this sense, their model
is formally similar to the special case of our model where competence is unobserved under
qualied immunity. However, because skills are endogenously chosen in our model, the results
are di¤erent. Third, their model focuses on the behavioral motivation" of o¢ cers, whereas
ours falls within a more standard enforcement framework. A nal important distinction is
that their model does not o¤er any comparative static results regarding how case complexity
can a¤ect the endogenous decisions to invest in competence.
Besides this literature on enforcement errors our paper is also related to the broader
literature on judicial errors and wrongful convictions (Lando 2006, Polinsky and Shavell 1989,
2007, and Png 1986). In this literature wrongful convictions are the result of limitations in
the detection technology so that with some probability there are always type 1 errors. While
Png and Polinsky and Shavell nd that wrongful convictions always lower deterrence, Lando
shows that wrongful convictions matter only if mistakes are about the act as opposed to
the identity of the criminal. This occurs because mistakes about the act a¤ect the marginal
cost of committing the crime (relative to not committing), whereas mistaken identity does
not (since one could be mistaken for committing a crime regardless of whether one has
committed a crime or not). However, Garoupa and Rizzolli (2012) point out that every
instance of mistaken identity must lead to a one-for-one" increase in a mistaken acquittal
(where a guilty person walks free). This second e¤ect will weaken deterrence, and therefore
errors of mistaken identity will almost always weaken deterrence.12
In all of these papers the probability of a wrongful arrest is exogenous, whereas in our
model wrongful arrests occur mostly due to the incompetence of o¢ cers, where competence
is chosen endogenously. We believe that endogenizing this decision is important for analyz-
ing conditional punishment schemes such as qualied immunity because as Bendlin (2012)
reputation by minimizing complaints (squawks) by citizens about o¢ cer misconduct.
12Mungan (2015) shows that punishments for attempts can give rise to wrongful convictions, therefore,
reducing the value of punishing attempted crime. We do not consider attempted crime in our framework.
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argues,
Qualied Immunity" gives government o¢ cials breathing room to make rea-
sonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent
[emphasis added] or those who knowingly violate the law.
Thus, in order to understand the impact of various immunity regimes on enforcement,
their e¤ect on competence needs to be understood explicitly.13 To our knowledge, our paper is
the rst to explicitly formalize the concept of qualied immunity in a model with endogenous
competence.
Following the introduction, in Section 2 we present the formal model, characterize the
full set of equilibria, and study the equilibria under full and no-immunity. Section 3 studies
the impact of qualied immunity. In Section 4 we discuss several extensions to our model.
The fth section concludes.
2 The model
Consider a model with two types of risk-neutral players: citizens (agents) and law enforce-
ment o¢ cers (henceforth, o¢ cers). O¢ cers choose whether to exert e¤ort to become com-
petent (1) or not (0), where E denotes the decision to become competent, and E 2 f0; 1g.
Competent o¢ cers are better at law enforcement in a way that will be dened precisely
below. The cost of becoming competent is e0 where e0  U [0; 1]; and where e0 may be inter-
preted as the intrinsic cost of acquiring policing skills. The fraction of competent o¢ cers is
denoted by ; which is endogenously determined.
Agents choose whether to be law abiding (innocent) or to commit a crime, where g0 
U [0; G] is their distribution of gains from committing a crime. An individual agents choice
to commit a crime or remain innocent is private information. However, o¢ cers possess a
belief that a fraction  of agents are innocent (non-violators). For example, if an o¢ cer
believes that half the agents are violators, then when confronted with an individual agent
he believes that with probability :5 the agent is a criminal. An o¢ cer is randomly assigned
to or matched with a citizen who might have committed a crime. A competent o¢ cer is
informed about the citizens type (criminal or law-abiding) with probability , and with
probability (1  ) he remains uninformed. This probability may represent the ability with
13Things might be di¤erent when there is little or full compliance. For example, in a city where everyone
speeds, the o¢ cer can sweep the streets" by giving tickets to almost everybody with impunity because the
likelihood of issuing a ticket wrongly" is very low. However, in our model the level of compliance is also
endogeneously determined by this action.
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which a competent o¢ cer can infer or interpret some (exogenous) signal" emitted by the
citizen. It could also capture the complexity of the situation or case, so that when  is low
o¢ cers have di¢ culty assessing citizenschoices. An incompetent o¢ cer is always completely
uninformed (i.e. can never interpret the signal), and therefore is guided by a (commonly
held) belief  about the citizen being innocent.14 Once the decision to become competent
or not is made, o¢ cers then choose whether or not to arrest an agent.15 If the agent is
a criminal, the arrest results in penalty f and the o¢ cer receives a reward of r < f for
arresting a criminal.16 Note that f may represent the expected ne, if the court system is
imperfect and the possibility of a type 2 error is not zero. For an innocent citizen all charges
are eventually dropped (or she is eventually acquitted) at some cost c < f to herself, which
may represent the legal fees associated with proving her innocence. Further, we assume that
c > 0 either because typically not all legal fees are compensated (as suggested in Daughety
and Reinganum 2013), or because there is some probability that a false arrest will lead to a
wrongful conviction.
It is worth emphasizing that there are two situations in which wrongful arrests occur
in our model. A wrongful arrest can occur when a competent o¢ cer is uninformed (with
probability 1   ) or because an incompetent o¢ cer chooses to make an arrest.17 However,
regardless of whether the o¢ cer is competent or not, an o¢ cer who wrongfully arrests an
innocent individual is faces an expected penalty d, d  0. As we show later, the nature of
the immunity regime depends on the value of d: Lower values of d can be identied with full
immunity and high values of d are associated with no-immunity, neither of which are granted
conditional upon the o¢ cers choice of E: In the next section we formalize the concept of
qualied immunity which allows for the possibility that immunity is granted only if E = 1:
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. O¢ cers realize their cost of acquiring competence (e0) and choose whether to become
competent or not (using their belief about the fraction of innocents). The individual
o¢ cerschoices are not observable.
14Our assumption that incompetent o¢ cers are completely uninformed does not a¤ect any of our results,
and is only introduced to simplify our analysis. All our results are valid as long as the competent o¢ cers
are informed with a higher probability.
15While we use the term arrest, it in reality captures a weaker form of detention or allegation.
16Here, r need not represent monetary compensation but instead represent promotions or other career
benets for o¢ cers who are succeed in apprehending criminals.
17Wrongful arrests by incompetent o¢ cers has often been described as harassment" in other regulatory
settings (Mishra 2009). For example, a competent consular o¢ cer can determine easily who is eligible for
a visa but the incompetent "harass" by requiring excessive costly documentation (c) even to those who are
eligible. We discuss these broader applications in the conclusion.
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2. Agents realize (and privately observe) g0 and then choose whether to commit a crime
or remain innocent based on their beliefs about the fraction of competent o¢ cers ()
and the models parameters and immunity regime.
3. An o¢ cer is randomly paired with an agent and the o¢ cer chooses whether to arrest"
the agent or not.
4. Courts acquit an innocent agent with certainty at cost c to the agent while guilty
agents are punished f . O¢ cers receive receive a reward of r for arresting a criminal
and incur a penalty d for arresting an innocent.
A few assumptions in the above model are worth assessing. First, our models results
are not sensitive to the assumption that e0 and g0 are distributed uniformly. The results
we present are robust to any distribution function that is increasing in e0 and g0. Second,
note that because the o¢ cerschoice is unobservable, the game is formally equivalent to the
o¢ cer and citizen moving at the same time. Third, we assume in stage 3 that all agents are
paired with o¢ cers. However, our model can easily be extended to the case where criminals
are more likely to be matched with an o¢ cer than an innocent agent. We consider this last
issue more carefully in section 4.
2.1 Equilibrium
We solve for the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game for all values of d, therefore,
inter alia for both the full and no immunity regimes. Our focus is on the equilibrium levels
of competence and compliance. Thus, we identify an equilibrium pair (e; g) where all
o¢ cers with e0 choose to be competent and all citizens with g0 choose to commit the crime
(non-compliance) and their beliefs are mutually consistent.
Two types of pure strategy equilibria are possible. In the uninformed arrests equilibrium
uninformed o¢ cers always make arrests based on their beliefs , and informed o¢ cers make
arrests only when they encounter a criminal. In the informed arrests equilibrium only in-
formed (hence competent) o¢ cers make arrests, and uninformed o¢ cers never make arrests.
Note that in the uninformed arrest equilibrium since not all agents are criminals some frac-
tion (determined in equilibrium) of these uninformed arrests will lead to wrongful arrests"
(i.e. arrests of innocents). Since both competent and incompetent o¢ cers can be unin-
formed, wrongful arrests will be committed by both types of o¢ cers. However, competent
o¢ cers make such errors at a lower probability than incompetent o¢ cers (since, 1   < 1).
In addition to these two pure strategies, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where
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uninformed o¢ cers make arrests some of the time.
To identify these equilibria, consider the decision of an uninformed o¢ cer, who may be
competent or incompetent. For a given belief  that the citizen is innocent, an uninformed
o¢ cer will make an arrest if,
 <
r
r + d
: (1)
When condition 1 is satised in equilibrium, uninformed o¢ cers always make arrests. There-
fore, 1 must be satised in an uninformed arrests equilibrium, and reverse strict inequality
must be satised in the informed arrests equilibrium. In the mixed strategy equilibrium 1 is
satised with a equality.
First, we study the uninformed arrests equilibrium (i.e. assuming 1). An o¢ cer chooses
to be competent if
0  (1  )d+ (1  )r   e0  ( d) + (1  )r;
Using e to denote the marginal o¢ cer, the previous equation simplies to,
e0  d  e: (2)
Turning to the citizens, an agent chooses to commit a crime if
g0   f  (1  )c:
Using g to denote the marginal citizen, the previous equation simplies to,
g0  f   c(1  )  g: (3)
where  is the probability of meeting a competent o¢ cer. Given our distributional assump-
tion, in equilibrium  = e, where e denotes the marginal o¢ cers e¤ort cost dened in 2.
Let the subscript u denote an uninformed arrests equilibrium and (g) the best response
function for compliance (given the fraction of criminals). Then from 2
u(g) = d
g
G
(4)
Similarly, let ' denote the best response for crime as a function of competence. Then from
3,
'u(e) = f   c+ ce: (5)
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The intersection of 4 and 5 yield the equilibrium pair (eu, g

u).
We now turn to the informed arrests equilibrium and use the subscript i to identify this
equilibrium. Using reasoning analogous to the uninformed arrests equilibrium, we can easily
characterize the best responses here. O¢ cers choose to become competent if (1  ) r e0 
0; which yields
i(g) = r(1  g
G
): (6)
Similarly, citizens choose to become criminals only if g0   f  0; which yields
'i(e) = ef: (7)
Finally, in the mixed strategy equilibrium the uninformed o¢ cer is indi¤erent between ar-
resting and not arresting and arrests with probability .
Equations 4, 5, 6, and 7 along with 1 can be used to characterize all the equilibria in our
model, which we identify in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Depending on the values of r; d, there always exists at least one of the fol-
lowing equilibria.
 Uninformed arrests equilibrium: In an uninformed arrests equilibrium, the levels
of competence and compliance are,
eu=minf
d(f   c)
G  2cd ; 1g
gu=minf
G(f   c)
G  2cd; f   (1  )cg:
 Informed arrests equilibrium In an informed arrests equilibrium the levels of com-
petence and compliance are,
ei =minf
Gr
G+ 2fr
; 1g
gi =minf
G2fr
G+ 2fr
; fg:
 Mixed strategy equilibrium In a mixed strategy equilibrium, the levels of compliance,
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competence, and the probability of arrest are,
em =
r
r + d
d
gm =
r
r + d
 =

rG
r + d
  f

1
(1  )(f   c) ;  = e

m
Furthermore, there always exists values of r and d for which each of the above equilib-
ria are unique, and where multiple equilibria consisting of both informed and uninformed
equilibria can exist.
Proof. Appendix
The existence of these equilibrium depend on the values of r and d and is fully charac-
terized in gure 1. In the region where d < minfdu; dig (the diagonal striped region of the
graph) immunity is strong, ceteris paribus. Hence, the uninformed arrests equilibrium exists
in this parameter space. In the region where d > maxfdi; minfdu; dgg (light gray region)
immunity is weak so that only informed arrests occur. This area reects higher values of d,
signifying extremely low immunity. For example, consider d > di, if either d > du or d > d
or both, then we obtain this region where wrongful arrests do not occur (i.e. only informed
arrests take place). Thus, we can identify the uninformed arrests equilibrium with the full
(or strong) immunity regime, while the informed arrests equilibrium can be identied with
the low (or no) immunity regime. In the former case the timidity e¤ect is weak (but the
competence e¤ect strong), while the later case the opposite is true. In addition, there are
two other regions to be noted. When di < du, then for d 2 [di;minfdu; dg] both informed
and uninformed equilibria co-exist (the multiple equilibria region). Instead, when du < di,
then for d 2 [du; di] the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies (this equilibrium exists in the
dark gray region of gure 1).
[FIGURE 1 about here.]
Figure 1 also allows us to identify an important characteristic of the uninformed arrests
equilibrium. In an uninformed arrests equilibrium with only competent o¢ cers, wrongful
arrests only occur with probability 1   . Nevertheless, these mistakes are in some sense
unavoidable because they reect the limitations that arise perhaps due to the complexity of
the case, which can never fully be ruled out. Indeed, these appear to be the kinds of mistakes
that judges appear to be willing to allow in order to prevent o¢ cers from being too timid.
Thus, the key question is whether wrongful arrests occur as a result of incompetence. It is
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clear that this is feasible when eu < 1, which is equivalent to d <
G
(f c+c)  d. Combining
this with the condition d < du, gure 1 shows that wrongful arrests by informed o¢ cers
occur when r is high but d is low. Further since d > 0, such equilibria always exist.
We now compare the various equilibria identied in proposition 1. The qualitative dif-
ference between the informed and the uninformed arrests equilibrium can be observed by
comparing gure 2 a and b where the two best responses are drawn in the competence-
compliance (e; g) plane. In gure 2a, which depicts the uninformed arrests equilibrium,
compliance and competence are complementary. When e = 0 there is still some compli-
ance because uninformed o¢ cers can make arrests. However, the compliance level is very
low, because all o¢ cers are uninformed and therefore commit many wrongful arrests, which
weakens deterrence for reasons identical to Png (1986). However, as competence increases,
there are fewer uninformed o¢ cers which leads to fewer wrongful arrests thereby improving
compliance. Thus, 'u(e) is increasing in e everywhere. For o¢ cers, as compliance increases,
the incentive for o¢ cers to invest e¤ort in becoming competent also increases because o¢ cers
want to avoid the costs d from wrongful arrests. Hence, u(g) is increasing in compliance.
[Figure 2 a and b here]
These characteristics of the uninformed arrests equilibrium stand out in sharp contrast
to the characteristic features of a standard inspection game (e.g. Tsebelis 1989, Mookherejee
and Png 1995). In a standard inspection game, when the enforcers e¤ort is 0 no criminals are
caught so the compliance level is 0. In our model compliance is strictly positive even when
e¤ort is 0. Further, in the standard inspection game as compliance increases, the incentive
to exert e¤ort decreases. Thus compliance and e¤ort are substitutes, whereas in our model
they are complementary. Both these results arise because we allow uninformed o¢ cers to
make arrests, and these uninformed arrests occur in equilibrium when 1 is satised. Hence,
not surprisingly, in the informed arrests equilibrium (gure 2b) the results are much closer
to the standard inspection game, where when competence e¤ort is 0, compliance is 0, and
further e¤ort is decreasing in compliance ((g) is decreasing in g).
Although, in the uninformed arrests equilibrium there will be more wrongful arrests, yet
from the standpoint of compliance it is not always clear which regime yields a lower crime
rate. It can be seen from proposition 1 that when eu = 1, at this corner solution compliance
is f   (1   )c > f > G2fr
G+2fr
. Thus, compliance is always higher with the uninformed ar-
rests equilibrium. This is so because when all o¢ cers are competent (e = 1) or competence
exogenous, then only the timidity e¤ect" matters. Thus, encouraging competent o¢ cers to
act when they are occasionally uninformed (with probability 1 ) strengthens enforcement.
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When not all o¢ cers are competent (e < 1) then both the competence and the timidity
e¤ects matter. Consequently, because of the tension between these two e¤ects, the level of
compliance in the informed arrests equilibrium may be higher or lower than the level in an
uninformed arrests equilibrium (gu ? gi ). That is, when d is small even uninformed arrests
discover criminals sometimes which strengthens deterrence, but fewer o¢ cers become com-
petent (which weakens deterrence). Whereas when d is large then o¢ cers do not act boldly
(which weakens deterrence), but because many are competent, deterrence is strengthened.
Turning to the mixed strategy equilibrium, note that compliance in this equilibrium is always
r=(r + d), hence it can never be higher than gu when e

u = 1. We summarize these ndings
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The level of compliance may be higher or lower in the uninformed arrests
equilibrium relative to the informed arrests or the mixed strategy equilibrium. Specically, if
eu = 1, then the level of compliance in an uninformed arrests equilibrium is always higher
than the level of compliance in an informed arrests equilibrium. If eu < 1, then the level
of compliance in an uninformed arrests equilibrium may be higher or lower than the level of
compliance in the informed arrests equilibrium.
Proposition 2 points to a critical di¤erence between our paper and DeAngelo and Mc-
Cannon (2016). In their paper, the reputation costs are analogous to our sanction d. When
these costs are high then in their paper (and ours) o¢ cers become more cautious" and,
therefore, are discouraged from enforcing the law. In their paper this causes deterrence to
weaken, which in turn increases crime. In contrast, in our model because competence is en-
dogenous, although a high d makes o¢ cers more timid (which weakens enforcement), this
e¤ect is o¤set by the competence e¤ect which strengthens deterrence. When the competence
e¤ect is stronger, crime rates may actually fall. Thus, our model shows that their results
may not apply when competence is endogenous.
Next we study the comparative statics at an interior equilibrium with respect to key
policy parameters in our model.
Proposition 3  In an uninformed arrests (full immunity) equilibrium eu and guare
increasing d; f ; and ; decreasing in c, and una¤ected by r:
 In an informed arrests (no immunity) equilibrium, ei is increasing in r; decreasing in
f , ambiguous in ; and una¤ected by d and c, while gi is increasing in r, f ,and ; and
una¤ected by d and c:
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 In a mixed strategy equilibrium, compliance is always increasing in r, decreasing in d,
and una¤ected by f or . Competence is always increasing in d, , and r and una¤ected
by f .
Proof. Follows from the derivatives of e; g identied in proposition 1.
It is insightful to contrast these comparative static results with those in a standard in-
spection game where larger nes can reduce inspection e¤ort (Tsebelis 1989, Mookherjee and
Png 1995). Here, in an uninformed arrests equilibrium compliance and e¤ort are comple-
ments. Therefore, larger nes increase equilibrium e¤ort (because it encourages compliance
which in turn encourages e¤ort). Whereas not surprisingly in the informed arrests equilib-
rium (where e¤ort and compliance are substitutes) the results are closer to the standard
inspection game. However, regarding compliance higher nes improve compliance (in the
informed and uninformed equilibria) in line with the Beckerian enforcement model (Becker
1968).
Second, in an uninformed arrests equilibrium, compliance and competence are increasing
in . One interpretation of  is that it reects the complexity of the cases which o¢ cials
encounter (low  implying more complex case), so that when  approaches 1 a competent
o¢ cer can identify a criminal easily, whereas with complicated cases he cannot identify the
criminal with such ease. Our analysis suggests that when there is full immunity, enforcement
institutions that face di¢ cult cases (i.e. on average encounter cases with a low ) will have
fewer competent o¢ cers than those institutions that encounter cases with a high . For
example, our model predicts that an agency dedicated to illegal arms dealing (presumably
facing on average low  cases) will have fewer competent o¢ cers than those departments that
deal with relatively easier cases. Thus, to encourage competence, in these cases a regulator
may want to reduce rather than increase the level of immunity (and raise the corresponding
penalty d). Importantly, in this equilibrium competence and compliance are not a¤ected by
r. Thus, large rewards for solving these complex cases will not be able o¤set these e¤ects. In
contrast in the no-immunity regime, competence may decrease with , so that institutions
that encounter more complex cases will have more competent o¢ cers than those that dont.
We discuss the implications of  more extensively in the conclusion.
3 Qualied immunity
We now turn our attention to studying qualied immunity. Under qualied immunity o¢ cers
are granted immunity as long as they acted competently. For example, police o¢ cers enjoy
certain degree of immunity unless there is evidence of gross incompetence (Bendlin 2013).
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In this section we consider the impact of qualied immunity on competence and compliance.
We show that in some cases qualied immunity can reduce the impact of the timidity e¤ect
without reducing competence.
3.1 Judicial certainty
We begin our analysis of this policy by assuming that the courts or the judicial system can
perfectly observe whether an o¢ cer is competent. Thus, within the context of our model, if
E = 1; the o¢ cer is not penalized, therefore, 1 can be rewritten as,
  r
r + (1  E)d (8)
Note that under qualied immunity a competent o¢ cer always arrests for any value of ;
whereas an incompetent o¢ cer arrests only when d < (1 )r: Thus, under this immunity
regime it is possible to incentivize a competent o¢ cer to make an arrest under uncertainty,
but disincentivize an incompetent o¢ cer doing so. Using this insight, it follows that an
o¢ cer will choose E = 1 if and only if
e0  minfd; (1  )rg: (9)
Like before, the nature of the equilibrium depends on the value of d and r.18 However,
unlike the analysis of the previous section, the competent o¢ cer always makes an arrest
when uninformed. Additionally, when d is su¢ ciently small (d < (1   )r), incompetent
o¢ cers are also willing to make arrests. Thus, this equilibrium is similar to the uninformed
arrests equilibrium of proposition 1. When d is large (d > (1 )r), only competent o¢ cers
make uninformed arrests (with probability 1  ) and incompetent o¢ cers do not make any
arrests. This is somewhat di¤erent from the earlier informed arrests equilibrium in the sense
that now competent o¢ cers make arrests even when they are uninformed. In this second
type of equilibrium outcome, qualied immunity allows competent o¢ cers to make arrests
when uninformed, but now incompetent o¢ cers never make arrests. Thus, while competent
o¢ cers are highly e¤ective, incompetent o¢ cers no longer contribute towards deterrence.
We consider each of these cases in turn below.
Case 1:Uninformed arrest equilibrium. First, consider the equilibrium outcome where
both competent and incompetent o¢ cers make wrongful arrests. Using 8 it is easy to verify
that the equilibrium levels of competence and compliance are given by,
18It is possible to o¤er a characterization of all the equilibria, similar to the one in proposition 1. But,
here we focus on the two pure strategy equilibrium outcomes.
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eu(QI)=minf
d(f   c)
G  cd ; 1g (10)
gu(QI)=minf
G(f   c)
G  cd ); f   (1  )cg (11)
Observe that eu(QI)  eu and gu(QI)  gu implying that the levels of competence and
compliance under qualied immunity are higher than the corresponding levels in the unin-
formed arrests equilibrium as given in proposition 1. Because only incompetent o¢ cers are
punished for making wrongful arrests, qualied immunity incentivizes competence. Thus,
even though qualied immunity does not completely eliminate harassment (i.e. wrongful
arrests by incompetent o¢ cers), it still reduces the frequency of wrongful arrests (relative to
the wrongful arrests equilibrium of proposition 1) because the fraction of competent o¢ cers
is higher.
Case 2: Competent o¢ cers arrest equilibrium. Next, consider the case where an incom-
petent o¢ cer does not make an arrest (because d is high): This case is similar to the informed
arrests equilibrium discussed earlier, except here only the competent o¢ cer always arrests.
Innocent citizens are arrested to the extent that technology (or case complexity) does not
allow competent o¢ cers to be fully informed (with probability (1  )). The equilibrium
levels of competence and compliance are given by,
ei(QI)=minf
rG
G+ r[f   (1  )c] ; 1g (12)
gi(QI)=minf
rG[f   (1  )c]
G+ r[f   (1  )c] ; f   (1  )cg
One can show that gi(QI)  gi ; implying higher compliance compared to the informed
arrest equilibrium in proposition 1. However, a similar claim cannot be made regarding
the competence levels. This is evident in the two gures 3a and 3b. It is straightforward
to observe that compliance rises in both cases, but that the level of competence may not
rise in Case 2. In Case 1 the incentives for the citizens are identical to the wrongful arrest
equilibrium in proposition 1, but the incentive for competence is now stronger because of
qualied immunity. Thus both compliance and competence rise in equilibrium (relative to the
case without qualied immunity). In Case 2 only competent o¢ cers make wrongful arrests
and incompetent o¢ cers do not make any arrests. Thus, deterrence is stronger relative to
the informed arrests equilibrium (of section 2) because now uninformed competent o¢ cers
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make arrests. However, the e¤ect on competence is ambiguous because although qualied
immunity strengthens the incentives for competence there is also more compliance, which
weakens the incentives for competence.
[Figures 3a and 3b about here.]
Using the equilibrium values of compliance and competence, we now state the following
result.
Proposition 4 Consider the uninformed arrest and informed arrest equilibria in proposition
1. For any given set of parameters, compliance is always higher but competence may be
lower in a regime with Qualied Immunity. Further, compliance is always increasing in 
but competence may be increasing or decreasing in .
Proof. When (1  )r  d, then
eu(QI) =
d(f   c)
g   cd >
d(f   c)
G  2cd = e

u; and g

u(QI) =
G(f   c)
G  cd >
G(f   c)
G  2cd = g

u;
because  < 1.
When (1  )r > d, then
gi(QI)   gi = f(1 + )  c > 0 and gi(QI)   gi = G  r(f   c) > = < 0:
The comparative statics follow directly from the derivatives of the equilibrium values
with respect to .
Further, it follows from the equilibrium values of gi(QI) and e

i(QI) that compliance is
always increasing in ; but competence is increasing in  in Case 1 but it is decreasing in 
in Case 2. It is interesting to note that an increase in  can lower competence with qualied
immunity. This arises because an increase in  reduces enforcement errors which makes
compliance more attractive. This in turn makes competence less attractive since there are
fewer criminals and also because mistakes are not punished. We discuss the implications of
this result more extensively in the conclusion.
3.2 Judicial uncertainty
The previous section showed that qualied immunity allows the legal system to eliminate
the timidity e¤ect only for competent o¢ cers. This e¤ectively created a new equilibrium
(case 2) where the competent always arrest (regardless of whether they are informed), and
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the incompetent never make arrests. It remains to be seen whether this rather desirable
equilibrium can be sustained when the judge possesses some uncertainty regarding the o¢ cers
type.
To formalize this notion assume that the court observes E with probability  and with
probability (1   ) it does not observe E. When the court does not observe E it must
formulate posterior beliefs about the o¢ cers competence based its priors. Let  be the
posterior probability that the o¢ cer who arrested the citizen is competent (E = 1). Clearly,
 must depend on the reporting strategies of competent as well as incompetent o¢ cers and
the prior . Therefore, consider the beliefs of the court in case 1 where both o¢ cers follow
identical strategies.19 In this case the beliefs are given by,
 =
8<:E with probability (1 )
(1 )+(1 ) with probability (1  )
from which it follows that =() > 0;   1 when the court does not receive a signal. By
contrast, if the competent o¢ cer always arrests and the incompetent o¢ cer does not (as in
case 2), then the only errors come from competent o¢ cers, hence when E is not observed
 = 1 (when E is observed  = E).
Using this framework we characterize qualied immunity as a standard  such that
immunity is granted only if   . We now state the following proposition which shows
that qualied immunity is e¤ective only if the court is su¢ ciently informed.20
Proposition 5 There exists a  < 1 and a  <  such that qualied immunity allows
competent o¢ cers to make arrests (and strengthens deterrence) if  > . If  < , then
qualied immunity is ine¤ective in the sense that it leads to the same compliance level as the
informed arrests equilibrium without qualied immunity gi .
Proof. Consider the equilibrium (similar to case 2) where only the competent make
uninformed arrests. When E is not observed, which happens with probability (1   ) the
court believes that  = 1: So the court grants immunity whenever it does not observe the
o¢ cers type (for any ). This can be sustained as an equilibrium if incompetents expected
payo¤ from arrest is (1   )r   [d + (1   )0] < 0: Equivalently, the incompetent o¢ cer
will not arrest if and only if d  (1   )r: Solving for the equilibrium value of  it is
19Note that the competent o¢ cer does not arrest an innocent citizen when informed. When we say identical
strategies we are comparing competent but uninformed and incompetent o¢ cers.
20In a di¤erent context, Geest (2012) also shows that uncertainty about the standardsof liability leads
to ine¢ cient levels of care.
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straightforward to check that there exists an equilibrium identical to the competents arrest
equilibrium (as given in 12)
 >
G
d[f   (1  )c]   (13)
Now,suppose the court does not grant immunity whenever E is not observed. Here even
the competent o¢ cer will not make any uninformed arrests if and only if (1 )d > (1 )r:
If this is satised, the incompetent o¢ cer will also not make any arrests as d > (1 )d >
(1   )r: This means that in equilibrium no innocent citizens will be arrested and we can
specify the out-of-equilibrium belief by the court whenever a citizen is found innocent to be
 = 0: In this equilibrium,  = g

i
G
the compliance level of the informed arrests equilibrium
in proposition 1. From this it follows that when   1   G
d2f
; the competent will make
no uninformed arrests.
Finally, we consider the uninformed arrests equilibrium where both types of o¢ cers make
arrests. Like before, the competent o¢ cer gets immunity with a positive probability and
incentive for competence will depend on the extent of this. However, it will be always be
lower than the certainty case and accordingly, both compliance and competence will be
lower relative to the judicial certainty case. When there is full judicial uncertainty ( = 0)
an o¢ cers decision to become competent and subsequently arrest depends on the aggregate
level of competence (in addition to ). It is easy to observe that for any , there exists a
corresponding  so that for any   ; the arrest condition 8 is always satised and there
is no incentive to choose E = 1: In other words, if    then everyone receives immunity,
but in this case there is no incentive for anyone to be competent, therefore,  =  = 0 and
violates the requirement that   : In this case the crime level is the highest possible level
at (f   c) :
It should be noted that we do not characterize the entire set of equilibria under qualied
immunity. Our objective here has been simply to argue that to the extent courts decision
to grant immunity is based on subjective beliefs about an o¢ cers competence, qualied
immunity does not work.21 Both competent and incompetent o¢ cers will benet from this
immunity and consequently, there will be no incentive for competence. Thus, uncertainty
introduces a lemons problem, which results in all o¢ cers being of low quality" in the sense
of being incompetent. It is worth noting here that in DeAngelo and McCannon (2016) skill
levels (i.e. competence) are exogenous, hence there is no lemons e¤ect in their model. Again,
this emphasizes the importance of endogenous competence.
21When  2 (; )
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4 Discussion and extensions
The results from the preceding sections suggest that the relationship between various im-
munity regimes and crime is not obvious once competence choices are recognized. We now
examine whether these rather surprising results are robust to alternative assumptions, and
consider extensions to this framework.
4.1 Enforcement e¤ort
In our model the role of e¤ort is slightly di¤erent from the role it occupies in most models of
enforcement (e.g. Mookherjee and Png 1995) where the probability of detecting a criminal
is continuous and increasing in enforcement e¤ort e, where for simplicity e is the cost of
e¤ort. Our model can be written within this framework. Specically, let m(e) be the
probability of detecting a criminal (for e¤ort level e). Then the o¢ cer chooses e to maximize
r   g(1  m(e))d   e. Clearly, the optimal e is now increasing in the fraction of compliant
agents. Thus, the complementarity between e¤ort and compliance remains, and the results
that follow are identical to our model. Nevertheless, the legal scholarship implicitly considers
competence as a binary choice (i.e. a judge rules whether an o¢ cer acted competently" or
incompetently"). Thus, to better relate to this literature, we choose to model e¤ort in this
way.
4.2 Criminals versus innocents
We also assume that the probability that an o¢ cer is matched with a citizen is 1. However,
an o¢ cer may be more likely to encounter a criminal rather than an innocent, perhaps
because criminals are closer to the crime scene. To recognize this possibility, let  (> )
be the probability that a criminal (innocent) encounters an o¢ cer. Then when uninformed
arrests can occur, an agent chooses to be a criminal if
g0  f   c(1  ) or; '(e) = f   c(1  )
Likewise, an o¢ cer chooses to be competent if
e  d or, e(:) = d:
Comparing these with (2) and (3), it is clear that all the essential features of our model are
preserved.22 And, interestingly, now in an uninformed arrests equilibrium if  = 0, then
22Condition 1 is now   rr+d .
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there is no incentive for the o¢ cer to become competent, but compliance is high because
criminals are always arrested (when they encounter the police).23
4.3 The role of warrants and search and seizure" law
The model in section 2 and 3 overlooks the role of search and seizure law in limiting the
incidence of enforcement errors. In light of this, in this section we compare the e¤ectiveness
of our policy (of internal sanctions) with the e¤ectiveness of using search and seizure" law
to minimize enforcement errors and crime.24
Warrants are the primary tool that search and seizure law employs to minimize Fourth
Amendment violations. The model of section 4.2 can be re-interpreted to account for war-
rants. Specically, let  () be re-interpreted as the probability that a judge grants a warrant
to a criminal (innocent). Since a judge is more likely to grant a warrant for a criminal rather
than for an innocent citizen, it implies that  >   0 (assuming that these probabilities are
exogenous). In this case, a criminal is ned f with probability  while an innocent citizen
incurs costs c with probability (1  ). Similarly, an o¢ cer is competent only if e  d.
Clearly, this results in conditions that identical to those derived in section 4.2, therefore, the
key results of our model are still preserved.
However, a straightforward calculation of this equilibrium o¤ers an interesting nding:
the presence of warrants does not necessarily increase the level of competence. Intuitively,
this result arises because the judge granting the warrant now shares some of the risk of the
enforcement error.25 Consequently, the incentive to become competent is weaker. Because
competence may be lower, the enforcement errors and crime rates may rise. Thus, our
model shows that warrants on their own are not su¢ cient to reduce enforcement errors when
competence is endogenous.
Besides warrants, the exclusionary principle is another aspect of search and seizure law
that can discourage wrongful arrests. Under the exclusionary principle judges can exclude
evidence if they believe that the evidence obtained by the police violated the suspects
23A similar outcome arises when o¢ cers target repeat o¤enders with a higher probability. Our model
could be extended to study this issue as in Miceli (2013) and McCannon (2009).
24Additionally many legal decisions, especially concerning qualied immunity, revolve around o¢ cers exe-
cuting search warrants that were later determined to be invalid. For example, in Messerschmidt v. Millender
(2012) a boyfriend threatened to kill his (ex)girlfriend and red at her with his shotgun. O¢ cers applied
for a warrant to search the house of the acquaintance (Millender) he was living with. The search did not
nd the particular weapon, but it did nd other weapons and evidence of gang activity by Millender and
other household members. Under the doctrine of qualied immunity the Supreme Court granted the o¢ cers
immunity concluding that an o¢ cer would have reasonably concluded that the boyfriend could have used a
di¤erent weapon to harm Kelly and hence seizing all rearms from the house was reasonable.
25See Dharmapala and Miceli (2012) for a similar argument.
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constitutional rights. Mialon and Mialon (2008) develop a model to evaluate the e¤ectiveness
of the exclusionary principle. In contrast to much of the economic literature in this area, in
their paper (as in ours) crime is endogenous. Because crime is endogenous they nd that
applying the exclusionary principle more strictly can raise crime rates. Intuitively, if judges
apply the exclusionary principal strictly," it will reduce o¢ cers incentives to investigate
because they know that it will lead to fewer convictions. However, fewer convictions will
result in more crime, which increases the o¢ cersincentives to investigate. If the rst e¤ect
is stronger than the second, crime will rise when the exclusionary principle is applied more
strictly.
Increasing d in our model could be viewed as similar to applying the exclusionary principle
strictly. Indeed similar to their ndings, in our model a larger d results in the timidity
e¤ect (which reduces policing) and increases the incentives for crime. But, the higher crime
rate encourages policing, which reduces crime. Thus, with both internal sanctions and
the exclusionary principle there are two o¤setting e¤ects from strengthening the respective
policy. However, in contrast to the exclusionary principle, our paper shows that raising d
always lowers crime and reduces wrongful arrests. This distinction arises because there are
two critical di¤erences between these two policies and their e¤ects on crime and wrongful
arrests.
First, the exclusionary principle applies even to criminals in the sense that even if a judge
believes that a suspect is guilty, she may still decide that the evidence obtained violated
that suspects Fourth Amendment rights. In contrast, in our model the penalty is imposed
on o¢ cers only when they have violated an innocent citizens rights. This distinction is
especially important because judges are required to defend a suspects constitutional rights
even if that individual is believed to be guilty. Whereas a police department can, in principle,
choose to only penalize o¢ cers when they have violated an innocent citizens rights. Thus,
internal sanctions may o¤er more exibility than the incentives o¤ered under the exclusionary
principle.
Second, although the o¤setting timidity e¤ect" arises under both the exclusionary prin-
cipal and disciplinary sanctions, because o¢ cerscompetence choices are endogenous in our
model, we identify another e¤ect: the competence e¤ect. This third e¤ect is not explored in
the existing search and seizure literature.26
26There are additional di¤erences between Mialon and Mialon (2008) and our model. Specically, in our
model crime can be lower or higher in an equilibrium in which the police always search everyone when
compared to a regime in which the police only search when they have probable cause. Whereas in Mialon
and Mialon (2008) crime is always higher in an equilibrium where the police always search everyone (when
compared to the case where they only search when they have probable cause). This distinction arises
23
Consequently, because of these di¤erences, raising d unambiguously lowers crime and
reduces enforcement errors whereas the two main policies under search and seizure law
(warrants and the exclusionary principle) appear to have an ambiguous e¤ect on crime once
competence is endogenized.
4.4 Victim compensation
In addition to warrants and the exclusionary principle, it has also been argued that com-
pensating victims (of false arrests) can minimize enforcement errors. This compensation is
usually implemented through either the tort system, or exoneree compensation," where the
government compensates victims for errors. We now briey discuss our ndings within the
context of these two compensation policies.
Our model can be interpreted through the lens of tort law so that a large d is equivalent
to a strict liability rule (no immunity case), the case with d = 0 no liability (full immunity),
and qualied immunity equivalent to negligence. In this framework meeting appropriate
standards of care constitutes the o¢ cersâe choice to become competent. From this per-
spective our model can be viewed as extending the literature on torts to the context of law
enforcement. In doing so, the probability of harm is endogeneously derived by accounting
for the strategic interaction between the citizenâe s decision to commit a crime and the
o¢ cersâe competence decisions. Whereas in much of the liability literature, this is re-
duced to a single simple probability. As we show, endogeneously deriving this probability
allows o¤ers useful insight into how equilibrium competence, crime, and enforcement errors
are a¤ected by changes in the liability regime.
When viewed through the lens of tort law our ndings suggest that negligence (i.e. qual-
ied immunity) is not always superior to strict liability (see proposition 4). Specically,
under judicial certainty we show that the level of crime under qualied immunity (with ju-
dicial certainty) is lower, but competence may not be higher. Consequently, enforcement
errors may be higher under negligence. Whereas under judicial uncertainty, this result no
longer holds since we show that compliance may be higher or lower than the case with strict
liability.
These ndings, however, point to a key distinction between the negligence literature (with
because Mialon and Mialon assume that criminals whose 4th amendment rights are violated are never
punished. Whereas in our model criminals who are investigated are punished (even if the investigation may
have violated their rights). Because of this âedragnetâe·I a¤ect in our model crime can be lower when the
police search everyone (in contrast to their model). We believe that this di¤erence is noteworthy since this
assumption of Mialon and Mialon has been criticized elsewhere in the literature as being unrealistic (Kerr
2016).
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a unilateral standard of care) and the issues studied in our paper. In general, the goal of
liability law is to achieve the socially e¢ cient standard of care; that is, the level of care that
minimizes the sum of the cost of care and the expected harm. In contrast, the goal here
is to prevent crime while minimizing the expected harm from errors, where both the crime
rates and the rate of errors are related in equilibrium.27 Hence, the objectives here are more
complex. In this regard, our ndings show that while errors may be lower crime rates may
be higher under some regimes, therefore, balancing these two objectives may be challenging.
Thus, while the results here are similar to those discussed in the literature on torts, our
ndings suggest that more research is necessary to understand these tort law within the
context of law enforcement, especially when the probability of harm is determined by the
equilibrium decisions of criminals and law enforcers.
A related form of victim compensation is exoneree compensation. Klick and Mungan
(2016) show that exoneree compensation can be used to reduce the perverse e¤ects of wrong-
ful convictions. Further, they show that citizens who are exonerated are compensated appro-
priately they will reject plea bargains more often. Thus, fewer false arrests and convictions
will occur.
While exoneree compensation can reduce errors (ex-post), the mechanism we propose
here is an attempt to alter the ex-ante incentives of o¢ cers to become competent, which in
turn reduces errors. Specically, we show that disciplinary action can be used to encourage
o¢ cersâe decisions to become competent which can prevent wrongful arrests from occurring
in the rst place. Arguably, encouraging competence is important because it is a human
capital investment that a¤ects all of the o¢ cerâe s subsequent interactions with citizens.
In contrast, exoneree payments do not create incentives for o¢ cers to become competent (and
prevent wrongful arrests ex-ante). Instead, such policies usually transfer the risk of making
mistakes away from the o¢ cer and towards the taxpayer (see Kerr 2016 for evidence in
support of this argument) - which may reduce the incentives for competence. Further, since
exoneree payments are made on a per case basis the long term costs could be considerable.
Thus, the long term welfare benets of disciplinary policies could be considerably higher
than exoneree compensation. In light of this, our model suggests that there may be a unique
value to the disciplinary policies we study, especially from dynamic welfare perspective. We
leave it to future work to study this issue more closely.
27The cost of taking more care to avoid enforcement errors could also include the higher crime that results
from more careful policing. Our framework recognizes that these costs and the expected harm will be related
through the equilibrium behavior of both players.
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4.5 Bribery
Finally, in other models (e.g. Polinksy and Shavell 2001) a form of wrongful arrests occur
when o¢ cers frame innocent citizens for crimes they did not commit unless they are paid
a bribe (extortion). We study an extension (not reported here) with both bribery and ex-
tortion and nd that these practices discourage investments in competence, which in turn
makes wrongful arrests more likely to occur in equilibrium. Hence, although in other con-
texts bribery has been shown to encourage enforcement e¤ort (Mendez 2014, Mookherjee
and Png 1995) our ndings suggest that it may not encourage competence. Additionally,
our results also imply that because corruption discourages competence, when o¢ cers are
corruptible they must be granted less rather than more immunity. This result is particu-
larly interesting because the link between competence and corruption has been identied
in other contexts in the literature. For example, Gambettas (2009) empirical study nds
that corrupt bureaucrats often choose to be incompetent at their work in order to prove to
criminals that they lack better alternatives", and therefore will not renege on their corrupt
transactions. We leave it to future work to study the relationship between competence and
corruption more carefully.
5 Conclusion
Many legal jurisdictions give law enforcement o¢ cers considerable immunity from being
penalized for wrongful arrests or wrongful detentions of innocent individuals. Support for
these immunity policies largely stems from view that it prevents o¢ cials from being timid and
enhances their ability to detect and arrest criminals or other o¤enders. However, the results
of our model suggest that such policies can have perverse incentives due to the competence
e¤ect. Specically, by reducing the penalty for arresting innocent individuals, full immunity
gives o¢ cers weak incentives to invest in costly measures that make them more capable
of distinguishing criminals from innocents. Thus, instead of decreasing the level of crime,
such policies may increase the level of crime by reducing the incentives for o¢ cers to invest
in human capital that makes them better enforcers. Consequently, decreasing the level of
immunity may reduce crime even though it makes more o¢ cers more timid" to take action
when they are uninformed about the agents choices.
Although there is no econometric evidence for this e¤ect, there is some anecdotal evidence
that not punishing o¢ cers for false arrests can lower competence even though it deters (some)
crime. For example, David Simon (the former Baltimore Sun crime reporter), notes that in
order to reduce crime Baltimore police began to sweep the streets" by placing many innocent
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individuals in jail (Simon 2015). To prevent the police department from being sued for this
practice, he notes that the [police] actually had police supervisors stationed with printed
forms at the city jail that said, ...you can go home now if you sign away any liability the city
has for wrongful arrest, or you can not sign the form and spend the weekend in jail until
you see a court commissioner. And,.. thousands of people signed that form." He argues that
while such a practice may have reduced crime, it also allowed o¢ cers to avoid becoming
competent at identifying criminals.
To disentangle the timidity and the competence e¤ect, we consider whether qualied im-
munity can mitigate some of these perverse e¤ects of granting full immunity. We nd that
when the judicial authorities can observe the o¢ cers competence decision, then qualied
immunity does raise compliance, reduce harassment and wrongful arrests, and improve the
competence of o¢ cers. However, when there is judicial uncertainty regarding the o¢ cers
competence choice, then qualied immunity may actually lower the overall level of compe-
tence and increase harassment and wrongful arrests. We believe that this result is especially
important in light of U.S. Court rulings that have concluded that as long as the o¢ cers are
acting competently" they are immune from being sued for apprehending an innocent indi-
vidual. Our model suggests qualied immunity will resolve this tension only when judicial
authorities have perfect information regarding the o¢ cers competence choice.
Second, we nd that there is an intricate relationship between case complexity and an im-
munity regime. When there is full immunity, then o¢ cers become less competent when they
encounter more complex cases (low ). Further, since rewards r does not a¤ect competence
in a full immunity regime, high powered" incentives for o¢ cers who encounter complex
cases cannot be easily used to correct this problem (See proposition 3). Whereas, without
immunity competence levels may rise with more complex cases. This result is especially
interesting in light of Justice Powell (Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800 [1982]), who writing
for the court stated that
that high o¢ cials require greater protection than those with less complex discre-
tionary responsibilities.
Thus, according to his reasoning more complex cases require more rather than less immu-
nity. Similarly, many counter terrorism laws that presumably apply to very complex cases,
give enforcement o¢ cials broad powers of immunity to question and detain suspects.28 Our
ndings suggest that these laws can have a perverse a¤ect on the overall competence levels
28It is possible that terrorism cases are actually easy high ", in which case this would not apply.
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in agencies designated to tackle these cases. Indeed, in some cases precisely the opposite
policy (to the one suggested by Justice Powell) may need to be adopted in agencies that sud-
denly encounter more complex (low ) crimes in order to encourage competence and improve
overall compliance.
If instead  is interpreted more narrowly as the technology available to reduce type 1
errors, then our model o¤ers insight into the e¤ect of improving the detection technology.
We show that the e¤ect of raising  depends upon the immunity regime, so that in some
cases these improvements may crowd-in" or crowd out" competence and even weaken de-
terrence. Specically, under full immunity the joint probability of wrongful arrests (1  eu)
decreases with an increase in , and compliance rises unambiguously with . Whereas under
no immunity the joint probability of a wrongful arrest ei (1   ) may increase or decrease
with  even though compliance again rises unambiguously with . Indeed, in this case even
if raising  lowers the probability with which innocents are arrested, the joint probability of
letting a criminal walk free", ei (1   ) + (1   ei ) may actually rise. Thus, under full or
no immunity, technological improvements may not have the desired e¤ect of reducing either
type 1 or type 2 errors in policing, even if it does reduce crime.
In contrast to both these regimes, under qualied immunity (with judicial certainty) and
with large penalties for incompetent o¢ cers the probability of a wrongful arrest ei(QI)(1  )
always falls with technological improvements. Thus, under qualied immunity technologi-
cal improvements reduce wrongful arrests and raise compliance, thereby, allowing agencies
to reduce errors and raise compliance simultaneously. Taken together, these results show
that e¤orts to reduce type 1 errors through improved technology may not always have the
desired e¤ect and depend on the immunity regime adopted by the agency. Furthermore, it
suggests that evaluating the success of technological improvements may be quite challenging
empirically, since such improvements may be o¤set by competence choices, which are in turn
inuenced by the immunity regime in place.
We conclude by discussing some possibilities for future work regarding immunity that
this paper raises. First, in our model under qualied immunity with judicial uncertainty, the
judges belief about an o¢ cers incompetence only depends on the current case. In principle a
judge may use an o¢ cers reputation (from past cases) to determine whether the o¢ cer acted
competent in the current case. Our static model does not allow for such belief formation.
However, it would be insightful to examine the results of this issue within the context of a
repeated game that explicitly modeled o¢ cer reputation. Second, we do not examine which
of these regimes maximize welfare, but leave this important question as a possible avenue for
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future research. Third, in our model there is only one level of crime. In a simple extension
(available upon request) we show that with three levels of crime (no crime, small and large
crime), if there are penalties for wrongful arrests, then o¢ cers will play it safe" by always
under reporting the crime level. This occurs because those who have committed a large
crime will not challenge the o¢ cer (since their sanctions are lower than what their crime
demands), while criminals who commit a small crime are appropriately sanctioned. Thus,
in general multiple crime levels result in under-enforcement in this context. However, it
remains to be seen whether the competence and timidity e¤ects identied here di¤er in a
more general model of marginal deterrence with multiple levels of crime.29 Finally, recent
legal debates have examined whether informers (or private citizens who cooperate with the
police or provide them with crime tips") should also be given immunity along with long
enforcement o¢ cials (Volokh 2014). Indeed, some legal scholars have argued that granting
immunity to informants in such cases could encourage sloppy policing" where o¢ cers are
tempted to rely on easily acquired anonymous tips rather than engage in arduous collection
of evidence" (Dery andMeehan 2015). These problems may be especially compounded in
counter-terrorism cases where o¢ cers may need to rely on tips" from the community. The
framework we developed here could easily be extended to study these issues. We leave it
to future work to examine whether immunity in such cases could help or hinder overall law
enforcement.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of proposition 1
First consider the uninformed arrests equilibrium. The solution to equations 4 and 5, subject
to the constraint that in equilibrium eu  1; and gu  f   (1   )c; provide the interior
solution to the wrongful arrests" equilibrium:
eu =
d(f   c)
G  2cd
gu =
G(f   c)
G  2cd:
We now determine conditions under which the above solution is an equilibrium. A necessary
condition for the existience of this equilibrium is d < G
2c
 d. Next, it is straightforward to
observe that these expressions are both increasing and continuous in d: Thus, if the solution
violates the constraints that eu  1; and gu  f (1 )c; then eu = 1; and gu = f (1 )c:
Finally, in equilibrium condition 1 is satised, if
 =
(f   c)
G  2cd <
r
r + d
() d < r(G  f + c)
f   c+ r2c  du:
Thus, if d < minfd; dug then there exists an equilibrium in which wrongful arrests occur.
The solution to 6, and 7 determine the equilibrium in the informed arrest equilibrium:
ei =
Gr
G+ 2fr
gi =
G2fr
G+ 2fr
:
At e = 0; ei (g

i ) > g

i (e

i ) = 0; and at e
 = 1; ei (g

i ) < g

i (e

i ) = 0; if r < f (which we
have already assumed). Thus, the above solution is always an interior solution. Turning to
the condition 1,
2fr
G+ 2fr
>
r
r + d
() d > G
f2
 di:
Hence if the previous inequality holds 1 is violated, and there exists an equilibrium in which
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no uninformed arrests occur.
Turning to the mixed strategy equilibrium for the case where 1 is satised as an equality.
The citizens choice of crime is determined by,
g0   f   (1  )f   (1  )c;
therefore, the marginal citizen is,
g = f + (1  )(f   c)
For the o¢ cers, the choice of competence is determined by
0  (1  )d+ (1  )r + (1  )(1  )r   e0  ( d) + (1  )r:
Since in this equilibrium  satises ( d) + (1  )r = 0 the previous expression simplies
to
e = d:
Substituting this expression into the expression for g and solving for  yields,
 =
r
r + d
 
G  2df 1
1  (r2d
r+d
)(f   c)
:
From this it follows that  2 [0; 1] if and only if d 2 [du; di]. Hence, this mixed strategy
exists only the region specied in gure 1.
Finally, with regards to gure 1, it is worth noting that d < di < d. Further, di does not
depend on r, but du is increasing and concave in r and intersects di at G(G f)2 . Hence, the
regions depicted in gure 1 always exist.
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Figure 2 (a) 
Competence increases with compliance because officers want to avoid d. 
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Competence decreases with compliance because officers the expected reward is low. 
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